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Abstract
The people responsible for building the IT products
and infrastructure of tomorrow – today’s students of
the computing disciplines – oftentimes do not have the
opportunity or proper motivation to develop
cybersecurity skills meeting the needs of the job
market. This paper introduces High Fidelity Live
eXercises (HiFLiX) a teaching/learning activity
designed to expose students to cybersecurity
challenges resembling those they could face in a future
work environment. We describe a HiFLiX prototype
study, conducted as a collaboration between the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s CyberSecurity
@CSAIL research group and NASA’s Jet Propulsion
Laboratory. Our analysis indicates that the proposed
delivery method met the stipulated cybersecurity
educational outcomes and increased the motivation for
future cybersecurity studies in the majority of
participants. Two previously unknown software flaws
were also discovered.

1. Introduction
The rapid spread and adoption of Information and
Communications Technology have put computing 1
engineers in high demand. However, as products,
services and even critical infrastructures have become
targets of antagonistic cyberattacks, recruiting
computing experts who also have an adequate
understanding of cybersecurity 2 has quickly become a
priority. Nevertheless, recruiting talent in this field has
proved to be a challenge. Hiring managers are
struggling to find candidates for open positions and
estimates project that several million cybersecurityrelated positions will be vacant in the coming years
[1][2].
1
Refers to the five ACM computing disciplines Software
Engineering, Computer Engineering, Computer Science, Information
Systems, and Information Technology.
2
Defined as a “computing-based discipline involving technology,
people, information, and processes to enable assured operations. It
involves the creation, operation, analysis, and testing of secure
computer systems.” [3]
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While the number of Bachelor’s and Master’s
graduates from engineering programs within the
computing sciences have doubled over the last decade
[4], students are generally not provided with the
learning options leading to the cybersecurity expertise
sought after by the market. Several reports have
pointed to the need of developing curricular guidelines
for cybersecurity education [5][6].
The relatively few students who have studied
security at university have oftentimes been exposed to
courses that are entirely theoretical, dealing with
principles and concepts rather than practice [7]. While
a class on computer security may cover such
foundational principles as the Bell-LaPadula model [8]
in depth, the students seldom get the chance to apply
their knowledge in practice, to develop independent
thinking, or to experience what a real-world
cybersecurity challenge may entail. While it is
important that students learn the theory (the “why”),
training them to apply theory (the “how”) is also
needed [9]. As recently noted by the ABET
accreditation organization, the incorporation of handson and practical cybersecurity instruction is a key part
in modernizing engineering education [10].
In this paper, the research question we seek to
answer is how practical cybersecurity exercises could
be designed to contribute significantly to educational
outcomes in this area. Our proposed delivery method
targets the use of hands-on cybersecurity skills. This is
done by exposing students to real-world systems and
mentoring them through realistic challenges, through a
collaboration between academia and industry.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2
reviews previous literature, Section 3 describes
security training exercises, Section 4 describes the
experimental setup, Section 5 outlines the results,
which are further discussed in Section 6. Our
conclusions are offered in in Section 7.

2. Related work
A considerable number of research papers
published during the last four decades deal with
investigations towards software engineering education
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from many different points of view. This section
provides an overview of the major trends in
cybersecurity education during the last decades and
suggests some relevant literature.
Although the nomenclature has evolved, the
question of how to best teach engineering students
cybersecurity is far from new. Many of the founding
principles of cybersecurity, at least in a technical sense,
can be traced back to the 1970s. The seminal paper
“Security Controls for Computer Systems” [11]
broadened the scope of computer security to include
protection of the data itself, limiting unauthorized
access. The “CIA triad” of confidentiality, integrity
and availability defined in 1975 is a core tenant of
cybersecurity education [12].
By way of the World Wide Web, the Internet was
brought to wider use during the end of the 80s. This
increased the importance of cybersecurity, as
emphasized by the ACM Task Force on the Core of
Computer Science [13]. Similarly, in their Master of
Software Engineering Curriculum from 1989, the
Software Engineering Institute (SEI) at Carnegie
Mellon University suggested that topics such as
security, along with privacy and software piracy,
should be discussed in context in all courses to set
examples for students [14].
In the 1990s, security started to become more
visible in various engineering curricula. For instance,
in the then emerging field of real-time computing,
security had a natural role [15]. At the 1996 IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, a special panel
was held to gather input from industry on cybersecurity
teaching requirements [16]. In their paper “Integrating
Security into the Curriculum” [17] Irvine, Chin and
Frincke establish that “the education [in engineering
programs] must result in graduates prepared for the
security challenges they will encounter in their
professional roles,” but that “too few computer science
and engineering programs today [1998] pay adequate
attention to security”. They also underscore that
educational outcomes must be consistent with those of
the larger engineering context. This is in accordance
with the established concept of Constructive
Alignment, used within the subject of pedagogy in
higher education [18].
Bertrand Meyer [19] highlights the importance of
“teaching by doing,” an approach necessary in
preparing students for professional cybersecurity
challenges. In 2004 a joint ACM-IEEE task force on
Computing Curricula published the Software
Engineering 2004 (SE2004) Curriculum Guidelines for
Undergraduate Degree Programs in Software
Engineering [20]. While SE2004 includes several
components relating to security, security still was not
defined as an independent knowledge area.

The President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection
Board [21] illustrated in 2003 how flaws in computer
software can lead to serious vulnerabilities in critical
infrastructure. For this purpose, the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) formed a group with the
task of defining a Common Body of Knowledge for
secure software assurance [22], where one of its stated
goals was to drive curriculum development in
academic institutions. The Carnegie Mellon SEI was
subsequently enlisted by the DHS to develop a
curriculum for a Master of Software Assurance degree
program [23]. In the paper “Foundations for Software
Assurance” Woody, Mead and Shoemaker define
principles underpinning a curriculum for such a
Master’s program [24]. Tom Hilburn and Dan
Shoemaker [25] discuss the security competency
required in the software engineering profession and
present models for competency management.
In 2015 the Joint Task Force on Cybersecurity
Education was chartered by the ACM Education
Board. Their publication Cybersecurity Curricula 2017
[26] is the to-date latest progression in curricula
development in the field. Important learning outcomes
include forensic analysis, penetration testing, ethical
hacking, and offensive techniques.

3. Security Training Exercises
Hands-on computing exercises have been
demonstrated as a very effective method of teaching
and learning cybersecurity [27]. Such exercises engage
learners and allow them to practice and hone essential
cyber-skills, recognized as a necessity by the majority
of the educational and professional communities [28].
There are several methods for introducing students to
security problems using training exercises. Perhaps the
most well-known are Capture the Flag (CTF)
competitions. CTFs are designed to encourage students
to find vulnerabilities in a designated computing
environment that was built for the specific purpose of
training. The predetermined vulnerabilities are
generally marked by “flags” which consist of a string.
Upon discovering the vulnerability, CTF participants
“capture” the flag by copying and pasting the string
into a validation website to receive points.
There are two types of CTFs – Jeopardy and
Attack-Defense. For Jeopardy CTFs, participants are
provided categories of security issues and techniques
that must be found and executed (e.g. Web, Binary,
Reversing.) In many cases, the categories are
sequential. For Attack-Defense CTFs, all teams are
provided computing infrastructure they must defend
while simultaneously tasked with attacking others’
infrastructure. Flags are recovered when identifying
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and submitting vulnerabilities in the team’s own
infrastructure which are subsequently patched. Flags
are also recovered when a vulnerability is found in an
opposing team’s infrastructure. Points are awarded for
submitting these flags. CTF rules of engagement, and
point distribution vary across CTFs. For examples of
different CTFs, see [29][30][31].
While CTFs provide a dynamic environment for
students to learn about security, there are several
disadvantages to their structure. First, CTFs are high
intensity environments that require participants to have
a knowledge base of security to be successful. There is
very little opportunity to teach new skills during a
CTF. Therefore, it is easy for less experienced
participants to get left behind those that have more
experience. Participants can of course learn by
watching, but it is not an optimal environment for
learning new skills due to the time pressure. Another
learning challenge during Jeopardy style CTFs is that
they are structured in category stages where capturing
one group of flags for a category – such as Web, will
unlock the next category of flags. The sequential
unlocking of tasks limits participant’s educational
exploration because it is easy to get stuck on a certain
task and be unable to try different exercises.
On a higher level, CTFs also lack a fundamental
component of cybersecurity education – helping
students connect the dots between existing
vulnerabilities and their origin. When breaking and
entering, and quick-and-dirty patching, is the rewarded
driver of an exercise, focus on understanding
cybersecurity principles and their best practice
application is lost.
One of our goals in developing the High-Fidelity
Live Exercises (HiFLiX) was to encourage participants
to think in terms of the “cyber kill chain” – a
description of the sequence of steps often used by
adversaries in real-world situations [32]. Rather than to
follow sequential predefined tasks we wanted the
students to consider how the model could be used to
attack a system, but simultaneously what flaws that
allowed them to do so, and what security controls that
could be applied to prevent a successful attack.
Further, we also wanted to capture participant attack
data which would mimic real adversarial activity.
To achieve realism in both exercise environment
and attack patterns, we designed a system with
networked hosts running NASA mission software and
services, including any pre-existing vulnerabilities. The
exercise would thus simulate a real-world environment
with high fidelity. Our hypothesis was that the
participants would find it more educational and
motivating to be exposed to real-world systems and
challenges, as opposed to the limited framework-style

environments that students are commonly presented
with in classroom labs.

4. Experiment
4.1 Overview
As mentioned in the previous section, our proposed
HiFLiX differs from other forms of competition-style
exercises on several accounts. It introduces the
participants to a real-world system environment, a
replica of a system used in production, instead of a
fictitious, competition-specific system. It also runs
over a longer period of time (in this case five days) and
offers continuous instructional support and guidance.
The exercise is not set up as a game or competition, but
rather a learning experience with a partially openended set of objectives. The experimental HiFLiX
described here was arranged as a collaboration between
the Cyber Defense Engineering and Research Group at
the NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) and the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s (MIT)
CyberSecurity@CSAIL research group. It was
developed by JPL and offered to students at the MIT
Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence
Laboratory (CSAIL) during the last week of MIT’s
four-week winter break independent activities period
(IAP) in January 2018. As the experiment was hosted
virtually using cloud services, the students preregistered for the experiment could take part either
from a computer lab at MIT, from their own home, or
any other place they chose.
The experiment had the following main goals:
(i) Evaluate if this type of exercise would satisfy
cybersecurity learning outcomes; 3
(ii) Gather data for cybersecurity-related research and
development tasks; and
(iii) Improve awareness of new attacker tools, tactics
and procedures.
A total of thirteen students actively participated in
the experiment. 4 They were tasked with achieving a set
of HiFLiX objectives in a network environment
configured to closely resemble a NASA mission
system. These included identifying and documenting
system weaknesses that could be exploited to extract
information. Some well-known exploitable flaws and
misconfigurations were intentionally planted, while
3

Targeting the understanding and applying levels of the Bloom’s
Revised Taxonomy, see: http://ccecc.acm.org/assessment/blooms/.
4
Only about half of the students who had initially signed up to
participate ended up doing so.
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also allowing for the possibility of finding previously
unknown vulnerabilities. Six students completed at
least one of the stipulated objectives, and two students
completed all the objectives. In addition, two
previously unknown Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
vulnerabilities were found in mission software.

4.2 Design
We summarize our design choices and rationale
into four categories, described below.
Problem design. The HiFLiX was organized to
encourage participation across a mix of hacker skills. 5
A pre-event survey indicated that almost 52% of the
potential participants were newbies with very little or
almost no knowledge of hacking, 26% were familiar
with hacking and 21% were experts in hacking. This
mix of skillset meant that our HiFLiX design had to
contain a mix of simple and complex problems to be
accessible and to be of interest to all types of
participants, from newbies to experts. Our problem
design strategy involved the following.
Traditionally, security exercises are very time
constrained. This limits the ability for students to learn
at their own pace. Further, objectives for security
exercises that are staged as described above limits
students’ ability to try new objectives when they are
stuck on a problem. To avoid these constraints, we
attempted to apply a constructivist learning model to
the HiFLiX. This Montessori-style pedagogy is
intended to promote discovery and diffuse frustration
caused by traditional educational training boundaries.
The Montessori pedagogy has been shown to be
successful beyond primary education [33]. In the spirit
of this educational approach, we chose to fully
virtualize the HiFLiX environment, maximizing the
flexibility of the exercise. We provided a window of
five days to complete the HiFLiX so the students can
learn and approach the objectives at a speed with
which they are comfortable. Also, we chose to allow
students to attempt any objective in any order. This
design decision was to enable participants to start with
whatever objective they found most interesting or
accessible so that they did not become discouraged by
the exercise.
We chose to rely on usage of such well-known and
freely available cybersecurity tools as Metasploit 6 and
John the Ripper 7 to solve most of the HiFLiX
problems. To make it easier, we provided students with

the popular penetration tester’s toolkit Kali Linux, 8 a
popular Linux distribution which comes pre-packaged
with a variety of tools for digital forensics and
vulnerability identification. This ensured that the
newbies would get a chance to learn new yet very
relevant tools by participating in the HiFLiX, while the
familiar and expert category participants could hone
their skills in the usage of these tools, or use their own
if they so preferred.
We embedded a few well-known vulnerabilities
and very common system misconfigurations to ensure
that all students could make progress in the HiFLiX
and advance their cybersecurity skills by quickly
identifying exploitable vulnerabilities common in real
software and systems. For example, we planted the
well-known Bash Shellshock vulnerability (CVE2014-6271) 9 and the more recent SambaCry (CVE2017-7494) in a few of the systems. These
vulnerabilities could be discovered directly through
Metasploit.
We planted some advanced vulnerabilities which
required some research and thought to challenge the
familiar and expert category participants. For example,
we planted a Java deserialization vulnerability in one
of the systems, which required participants to first
discover this vulnerability, and then use a combination
of tools to verify that it could be exploited.
Finally, we provided the experts with a system
containing real mission software and services and
challenged them to find previously unknown (zeroday) vulnerabilities. Overall, we designed at least two
of the three HiFLiX objectives (described in Section
4.5) to be solvable by most participants and had one
objective specifically targeted at the experts.
Infrastructure design. Our original strategy for the
HiFLiX consisted of us sending pre-packaged virtual
machines to each of the individual participants. This
was an easy approach and would have eliminated any
requirement for complex infrastructure setup and
management, but unfortunately it also made it
impossible for us to gain any real time visibility into
the actions of the participants, and monitor data from
the hosts in any meaningful way. It would have also
made it difficult for us to troubleshoot problems and
assist the participants. Remotely hosting the HiFLiX
on JPL’s infrastructure was another option but it was
fraught with security concerns and addressing those
concerns would have required a massive effort both in
terms of procuring the necessary approvals and the
engineering. We finally settled on hosting the HiFLiX
remotely on the Amazon AWS cloud. This enabled us

5

Here referring to aptitude in applied cybersecurity, including
computer system vulnerability evaluation and penetration testing.
6
https://www.metasploit.com/
7
https://www.openwall.com/john/

8
9

https://www.kali.org/
https://cve.mitre.org/
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Figure 1. Simulation of a portion of a real mission network

to construct a sophisticated and secure virtual
environment for each participant within a couple of
weeks. In addition, this also allowed us to fully
instrument the virtual machines and the virtual
networks for monitoring purposes and provided us near
complete control over all the aspects of the
environment, utilizing a web dashboard from the West
coast with the students located on the East coast.
Hosting the HiFLiX on the cloud also allowed us to
easily scale to a large number of participants within a
matter of minutes. In the end, this proved to be a costeffective solution both in terms of the time required to
setup and manage, and the overall cost of the resources
required to make the event a success.

4.3 Technical environment
We simulated a portion of a real mission network
for each participant, with three virtual machine hosts.
The missionweb simulates a web server which is
accessible from the internet. We use a stock install of
Red Hat Linux 7.3 along with a version the Apache
web server. The missionfs simulates a file server,
which is accessible only from the web server and other
machines inside the network. We again use a stock
install of Red Hat Linux 7.3 with various file sharing
software such as ftpd, NFS and smbd installed on it.
The missiondb is a real mission database server and
contains the base installation of real mission software.
All these three hosts are grouped into a single subnet.
The hosts were also logically isolated by way of port
and protocol filtering so we could control what was
visible from one host to the next. This provided us the
ability to slowly expose more to the attacker as they
progressed through the network from host to host.
Another subnet was used to simulate the external
adversary and consisted of one virtual machine
containing the Kali Linux distribution. Students were
only given direct access to this Kali Linux host, and

they had then to navigate their way into the mission
network to accomplish the HiFLiX objectives.
The environment, shown in Figure 1, was
replicated for each participant in the AWS cloud. Each
environment was instantiated as an Amazon Virtual
Private Cloud (VPC), which provided logical isolation
between each participant and ensured that they could
not interfere with each other’s environments.
Each host was instrumented to collect exercise data,
including network traffic, shell command history, disk
transactions, and system logs. In addition, flow logs
were enabled for each VPC in the AWS cloud
environment. This enabled monitoring the traffic
coming into and out of each VPC and between the
subnets. All data, except packet captures, was fed into
a Splunk 10 infrastructure in real-time, and each
participant’s data was tagged uniquely for future attack
analysis.

4.4 Vulnerabilities and misconfigurations
The following is a summary of the vulnerabilities
and misconfigurations planted across the hosts.
missionweb contained the Heartbleed (CVE-20140160) and Shellshock vulnerabilities exposed via the
Apache webserver, in addition to an SSH
misconfiguration which contained weak and easy
brute-forced passwords for several accounts on the
system.
missionfs contained vulnerabilities in the proftpd
FTP server, dnsmasq service, the sambacry
vulnerability in smbd, a privilege escalation
vulnerability in the sudo binary, and an NFS
misconfiguration which allowed the whole directory
structure to be mounted as root.
missiondb contained real mission software and was
largely left untouched to encourage discovery of zeroday vulnerabilities. The only vulnerability planted was
a Java deserialization vulnerability which was added
on top of the existing vulnerable ActiveMQ software
running on the host.

4.5 Objectives and Rules of Engagement
A welcome email was sent to the participants a
couple of days before the exercise. It described the
overall HiFLiX infrastructure, laid out the objectives,
set out the rules of engagement and the reporting
requirements.
The participants were made aware that the HiFLiX
exercise was designed to accommodate different levels
of previous experience in working with cybersecurity,
10

https://www.splunk.com/
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and cater to a mix of hacker skills. For beginners, a
main benefit would be to familiarize themselves with
new security tools to discover and document realistic
vulnerabilities in systems configured to resemble those
supporting NASA’s missions. Students with more
experience in penetration testing would have an
opportunity to explore complex attack scenarios that
may require use of advanced exploitation techniques to
discover unknown vulnerabilities. The three objectives
that were set forth were the following.
Objective A was to penetrate the simulated mission
network and extract information from the mission
telemetry database (identified as missiondb). The
specific information to extract consists of an
administrative username and password stored within
the MySQL database running on that system.
Objective B was to find and report at least eight of
the vulnerabilities (either planted or zero-days) along
with a proof-of-concept across the systems.
Objective C was to perform a security assessment
of the mission telemetry database and find at least one
significant configuration error or vulnerability in that
system.
A Slack channel (a popular messaging platform)
was setup for communication between the organizers
and the participants, and between the participants
themselves. Students were encouraged to offer general
support to other participants when possible but to
refrain from providing specifics or clear paths to the
solutions. Tips and hints regarding the exercise were
shared over Slack as the competition progressed.
Participants were also made aware that log and packet
data from the event was being collected. A list of rules
of engagement was shared with all the participants.
This included bans on disabling any of the exercise
monitoring tools, transferring content out of the
exercise environment, disclosing any discovered
vulnerabilities, and sharing used exploits.

5. Results
The experiment ran according to plan and was
successful in terms of student participation, how well
they were able to fulfil the exercise objectives, and the
amount of data gathered from the HiFLiX. In total,
thirteen students participated in the experiment, with
six students completing at least one objective. Two
students completed all the objectives.

5.1 Participant survey
Eight of the thirteen participants answered the postevent online survey, consisting of a set of questions
with multiple choice as well as free text answer

options. While we acknowledge that the sample size is
not statistically significant and thus does not allow for
declarative judgement, the results are used as
qualitative indicators of success. The respondents were
asked to answer questions related to their personal
impression of the exercise, to rate its perceived
difficulty level, to comment on its design and setup, to
describe their own cybersecurity competence level
before and after the exercise, and to estimate of how
well they believe they had reached the educational
outcomes of the exercise. Some of the more interesting
results of the survey are brought up below.
Six respondents were fully satisfied with the
exercise and none were disappointed. Two respondents
felt that the exercise could have been improved, mainly
referring to technical issues related to reaching the
objectives and to a perceived lack of documentation.
Five respondents found the exercise at the right
difficulty level, whereas three thought that is was too
hard. Six respondents found the allotted time for the
experiment (five days) to be adequate, whereas two
found it too short. Six respondents would prefer this
type of exercise over a traditional Capture-the-Flag
competition. Several respondents mention that being
exposed to real software and vulnerabilities increased
their motivation for the exercise. All the respondents
answered that they had learned a lot or gained
experience they considered to be valuable.
In the free text answers, several interesting
comments were given by the respondents. One person
mentions that a great benefit of this exercise, in
comparison to previous CTF experiences, was its
educational purpose. “This [exercise] helped us learn a
lot since the staff was on standby to help guide, or give
hints to, the students.” Another respondent also
mentions the “responsiveness” of the staff to assist and
instruct during the exercise. Several respondents
mention appreciating working on “real mission
servers,” and indicate that this was what had motivated
them to take part in the experiment. “I enjoyed having
to start with nothing and check everything for possible
vulnerabilities, along with how to exploit them.”
Of the more critical feedback provided in the
survey, most comments were focused on challenges
with the exercise. “I was confused about what I should
do in the first place, but that could be because I’m
inexperienced in [finding vulnerabilities in] real
software.” One respondent mentions spending too
much time on a task which did not contribute to
reaching the objectives, but goes on to reflect on that
this also resulted in a learning experience. Suggestions
given for future improvements include handing out
instructions longer in advance of the exercise and
providing more hints to the participants during the
exercise days.
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6. Discussion
As this study is limited in scope, and the number of
participants in the experiment was relatively small, we
cannot claim that the outcomes are replicable and
generalizable for future exercises. However, we
believe there are considerable insights we can draw
from this research, to continue improving methods for
hands-on cybersecurity education.
Choose-your-own-adventure works. In scoping the
HiFLiX, we aimed to develop a learning experience
tailored to the individual student. This entailed meeting
the students at their existing level of cybersecurity
education. In the spirit of Montessori approaches, and
unlike most CTFs, there were no qualifiers, minimum
skill requirements/prerequisites. This enabled students
who were complete novices to explore a new software
environment and promoted their general software
engineering exposure by allowing them to explore a
JPL mission system. Some participants commented it
was their first time using Kali Linux tools and the
ability to test the tools out in a safe place was valuable.
The more experienced participants were motivated to
find zero-day vulnerabilities in the environment
because it was a real mission system. When problem
sets are designed for CTFs, experienced participants
get into the habit of searching for certain
vulnerabilities that are token problems for such
exercises. Because the software engineering team that
developed this real mission system did not even know
all the vulnerabilities therein, the students were
encouraged to think outside of the normal CTF-type
flags. This was reflected in one student’s feedback on
“start with nothing and check everything.”
Additionally, a motivation for these security exercises
is always bragging rights. Finding zero-days for a
NASA JPL mission system provided ultimate bragging
rights – especially for MIT hackers. Nevertheless,
partnering with an industry or government actor from
the local area/region would in essence fill the same
educational purpose.
Support is essential. Student feedback revealed that
the choose-your-own-adventure was only successful
because of the support provided by the JPL team. The
structure of traditional cybersecurity exercises provides
boundaries and comfortable tasks to students. The
comparatively less rigid environment of the HiFLiX
required a support infrastructure that enabled quick
response times to student queries. Part of meeting the
students where their skills were required hands-on
educational communication. Students often asked the
support team questions like “how do I use a XYZ tool”
or “what can I try next?” The success of this HiFLiX

relied on bringing a live classroom experience to a live
security exercise, where fundamental security tests and
approaches were taught virtually while a student tried
to “hack away” at the exercise. While some CTFs may
have labeled this hands-on teaching environment as
“cheating,” we encouraged it so students would feel
supported in their experience and not abandon the
exercise in frustration.
A win-win-win for academia, industry and students.
Developing security exercises are generally either a
labor of love or a source of revenue. Academic
institutions build security exercises for students to
inspire future generations of security researchers and
analysts. Organizing such events is no easy or
inexpensive feat for the academy, considering the time
and resources required to develop problems, transport
students to the cyber range and host the infrastructure.
Beyond academic institutions hosting security
exercises there is also a cottage industry of security
companies hosting events targeted at hackers training
for high-profile security competitions such as
DEFCON. Hackers pay to participate in these events
and trainings. In this case, MIT’s CyberSecurity
@CSAIL research consortium partnered with NASA
JPL to host the event virtually. Through this
partnership, MIT was able to provide cost-free security
education to its students. The costs were instead
incurred by NASA JPL who spent considerable time
designing and constructing the exercise, as well as
supporting the participants.
Nevertheless, JPL realized considerable value from
hosting the event. An ongoing challenge for JPL, as for
many other organizations, is attracting high quality
software engineering security talent. This exercise
provided a forum for JPL to connect and work with
talented MIT students who expressed interest in
learning more about their work, thus paving the way
for recruiting opportunities. Compared to traditional
recruiting methods, JPL was able to interact with these
students and determine who might be a fit for their
organization based on how the participants approached
the exercise technically and even socially.
Another major benefit to JPL was that the relatively
open-ended forum allowed the participants to search
for zero-day vulnerabilities against the mission system.
Participants’ attacks on the mission system during the
HiFLiX were captured for analysis. JPL is now using
this data to identify common attack patterns against
their mission systems to better detect attacks as they
occur against their networks. Two zero-day
vulnerabilities were found by the students which JPL
was able to verify, mitigate and ultimately patch. As a
result, the HiFLiX acted as a low-cost security audit
for the mission system.
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From a student perspective, the benefits of
participating in the exercise are perhaps obvious, but
worth reiterating. Students were able to learn security
tools and techniques in a safe environment without the
constraints of CTFs and other more traditional security
training events. Further, students were working on a
real-life mission system that was representative of
security challenges that are found in industry. Finally,
students received real-time support from the teams that
work with these mission systems daily and were given
guidance as to how to approach the objectives
presented.
A remote virtualized environment is an enabler.
When the HiFLiX was in the early stages of design, we
considered flying MIT students out to Pasadena, CA
where NASA JPL is located, so they could run security
exercises on local mission systems. Considering the
transnational travel and security considerations due to
the sensitive nature of systems at JPL, the event
seemed financially and logistically challenging to
execute. Virtualizing the mission system environment
provided us the flexibility to accommodate all students
interested in participating without concerning ourselves
with the logistics of travel and garnering student
credentials to the JPL site. Hosting this event in the
cloud also enabled us to successfully conduct the
HiFLiX exercise without directly exposing JPL
networks or JPL system resources to the attacks carried
out by the participants. The virtualized environment
was also inexpensive to host in Amazon Web Services
(AWS) where we stood up 80+ systems and 20 virtual
private clouds for a total cost of $2,327.32. The whole
setup, from conceptualization to implementation, took
slightly over a month with about 200 man-hours of
effort. AWS also provided tools for usage analytics and
other data collection capabilities which were valuable
after the event was completed, to support future
improvements of the exercise. Future HiFLiXs should
also consider conducting remote and virtualized
environments to provide flexibility to students,
increased security control to the industry partner that
provides a real-life system for the exercise and to
minimize expenses.
Thoughts on HiFLiX replicability. We acknowledge
that this study was conducted in an environment and
with a partnership primed for success. Not every
institution has the academic resources of MIT or the
intellectual resources of NASA. To successfully
replicate the HiFLiX in other settings, we will share
some lessons learned in the organizational setup of the
exercise.
Some may argue that MIT is a unique institution
because of its student base and academic resources,

which could limit the broader applicability of HiFLiX.
We would, however, argue that there are good reasons
to assume that a similar approach could be successful
also elsewhere. The students who took part in the
exercise all had different levels of previous experience,
and were at various points in their computer science
education. There were no location-based benefits for
these students (everything was conducted virtually)
and the resources provided to them were all opensource and freely available. A similar spectrum of
students at other schools could thus well have
equivalent experiences. The guidance provided to the
students by MIT CSAIL security researchers centered
around tips on using the open-source tools. There is no
doubt that other security researchers and instructors
could provide similar general guidance.
While in the case of this HiFLiX, NASA JPL
made a sophisticated mission system available to the
participants, this need not be the case. We believe the
value of the exercise was not in the sophistication of
the system provided, but rather in the realness of the
mission system. With this said, it is not crucial for the
industry partner to create something new or intricate
for the students. Any real system can provide great
value compared to fabricated environments, and any
strong partnership between an academic institution and
industry could be the starting point for a successful
HiFLiX. In other words, the intellectual resources of
NASA are not required to replicate this learning
experience.
MIT’s CSAIL and NASA’s JPL had been working
together on various research and development projects
for over a year before running the HiFLiX. This
enabled the JPL team to learn about the students at
MIT who would be interested in such an exercise and
select a mission system that has features that could
appeal to these students. For example, most MIT
students that are interested in security focus on
systems. Rather than JPL building out a HiFLiX based
on their robust database structures, JPL provided a
mission system for the exercise. The pre-existing
working relationships between the two organizations
also enabled a degree of expectation setting for the
exercise. Expectation setting was important so that
there was no disappointing outcome for either party.
Both MIT and JPL were aligned on what each
respective organization hoped to achieve. The
relationship also made communication between MIT
and JPL before and during the exercise
straightforward. The JPL HiFLiX lead was in constant
communication with the MIT lead at CSAIL
concerning potential issues and progress as the week
progressed. Again, communication was simple because
of the existing trust and rapport between the two
parties.
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7. Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a new delivery
method for cybersecurity education. Introductory
cybersecurity related skills and learning outcomes are
in the process of becoming curricular requirements in
most accredited computing degree programs. Our main
contribution is thus given by offering an approach to
achieving these learning outcomes, through the
proposed HiFLiX concept. Although our experiment
does not provide us with conclusive results as to the
efficiency of the exercise as a teaching/learning
activity, we believe that the approach is promising and
merits future study and development. The preliminary
qualitative results show that the exercise was valuable
to students as well as the hosting organizations.
The first goal of the experiment was to evaluate if a
HiFLiX exercise would satisfy intended cybersecurity
learning outcomes. We conclude that most students
who participated in the exercise demonstrated
assessable proficiency in core cybersecurity concepts,
through achievement of learning outcomes on the
understand and apply levels of the Bloom’s Revised
Taxonomy.
The second goal, to gather data for cybersecurityrelated research and development tasks was reached by
the generation of an exercise dataset, and the third goal
was reached by discovering previously unknown
vulnerabilities in the NASA JPL mission system.
One of the main purposes of academic education is
to teach students how to synthesize information,
principles, concepts, and other materials to be able to
apply it to novel situations. While understanding
fundamentals
is
unarguably
of
importance,
cybersecurity expertise also requires an understanding
of tools, tactics and procedures and how they may be
applied. In this paper we have addressed the question
of how to enhance cybersecurity learning and to
provide students in computing sciences with an
opportunity to develop cyber-skills. Our proposed
solution, the HiFLiX teaching/learning activity, shows
that this can be done in a way that offers several
positive outcomes.
The suggested exercises contribute in preparing the
participating students for cybersecurity challenges they
may encounter in their future professional roles and
increase their motivation for pursuing subsequent
cybersecurity studies. The exercises also promote
constructive alignment between overarching security
educational goals and intended learning outcomes of
specific software reliability and assurance courses, by
fostering skills required for independent, innovative
and critical thinking.
Future work includes follow-up studies of
upcoming HiFLiX exercises during the spring semester

of 2019. This includes a planned study on the potential
benefit of incorporating them as a mandatory part of
the curricula within an engineering program. We also
plan to investigate how constructivist learning methods
can be further used in HiFLiX exercises so they can
become an even more accessible tool for security
education, serving as a missing link between computer
security education and cybersecurity training.
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